A Novel and Dedicated Machine Learning Model for Malware Classification

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Abstract: Malicious executables are comprised of functions that can be represented in assembly code. In the assembly code mining literature, many software reverse engineering tools have been created to disassemble executables, search function clones, and find vulnerabilities, among others. The development of a machine learning-based malware classification model that can simultaneously achieve excellent classification performance and provide insightful interpretation for the classification results remains to be a hot research topic. In this paper, we propose a novel and dedicated machine learning model for the research problem of malware classification. Our proposed model generates assembly code function clusters based on function representation learning and provides excellent interpretability for the classification results. It does not require a large or balanced dataset to train which meets the situation of real-life scenarios. Experiments show that our proposed approach outperforms previous state-of-the-art malware classification models and provides meaningful interpretation of classification results.

1 INTRODUCTION

Malware has been an increasingly serious threat to netizens all over the world, as there has been a tremendous growth in the volume of new malware broadcasting on the Internet (Kumar et al., 2019). To manually analyze malware samples is not efficient enough to prevent them from releasing their payload and causing damages. Most malware samples are variants of existing ones that fall into a known malware family (Nataraj et al., 2015; Kalash et al., 2018). Malware samples in the same family present similar behaviors and often share similar goals. Thus, it is crucial to build an effective malware classification system to automatically recognize the family of a new malware sample to discern its malicious intent. It is also important for the malware classification system to be able to explain its classification result so that malware analysts can validate the outcome and acquire new insights.

Nowadays, general-purpose machine learning models are applied to many kinds of classification tasks including malware classification (Moskovitch et al., 2008; Santos et al., 2013; Nataraj et al., 2011; Han et al., 2014; Yang and Wen, 2017; Kalash et al., 2018). However, there are several limitations coming with them. First, it is hard for ordinary machine learning models to both achieve good classification performance and provide good interpretability. Linear models are simple and thus have inferior classification performance but excellent interpretability. Non-linear models, however, have better modelling power, so they can achieve better performance, but lose interpretability from complexity (Cerna et al., 2019). Second, it is commonly known that the training of ordinary machine learning models (Bishop, 2006; Murphy, 2012) requires a large volume of data. The number of samples in each class is supposed to be several times larger than the number of features, or they tend to overfit the training set. This means that the models just memorize the labels of the training data, but cannot correctly classify unseen samples. Third, when the dataset is unevenly distributed among different malware families, ordinary machine learning models, in particular discriminative models, may fail to achieve a satisfying performance. Those issues are
problematic since different malware families could have quite different numbers of samples. The number of samples of some malware families could be small and thus much less than the number of features. Therefore, the performance of ordinary machine learning models are limited.

To overcome the aforementioned issues, instead of using an existing machine learning model, we propose a dedicated machine learning model that is specifically designed to classify a malicious executable to a malware family. Typically, an executable contains hundreds or thousands of functions. Even a small dataset with about one hundred executables has hundreds of thousands of functions in total. Therefore, our model handles the executable-level classification task at the function level. It is thus feasible to train the model even if the dataset is not very large in terms of number of executables. Unlike an ordinary classification approach, ours is developed based on the concept of discriminative assembly code function cluster, or simply discriminative cluster for conciseness. Discriminative clusters are sets of functions that are only common in certain malware families. They can serve as signatures for malware families and are robust against uneven class (i.e., malware family) distribution scenarios. We use the clone relation between functions in a target executable and functions in the clusters to determine the malware family of the executable. Thus, the classification results are interpretable.

We summarize the contributions of this paper as follows:

1. Our proposed malware classification model is novel because it not only achieves excellent classification accuracy and but also provides interpretable results to justify the classification result. Our method can precisely pinpoint which functions of the target executable belong to which clusters. The constituents of the formed clusters can also be visualized. This capability makes our model much more than just a classification system. The interpretability provides an addition layer of insights and evidence to reverse engineers.

2. Our model is more robust against the overfitting problem than the general-purpose machine learning models on small datasets. It is well known that training a classification system on a small dataset is more challenging than training it on a large one. Unlike an ordinary machine learning model that is directly applied to features extracted from samples, our method is dedicated for this specific classification problem. It does not require a large training set, since it handles the executable-level classification task at the function level.

3. We formally define the concept of discriminative cluster to effectively solve the uneven class distribution issue in malware classification. We also develop an optimized algorithm to efficiently construct discriminative clusters based on our novel locality sensitive hashing-based method, which significantly reduces the time complexity of function clustering.

The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces related work. Section 3 provides the details of our proposed method. Section 4 presents the experiment results and analyses. Section 5 concludes the paper.

## 2 RELATED WORK

Schultz et al. (2001) propose to use imported DLLs, functions, printable strings, and bigram byte sequences as features for malware detection. Since the number of different bigram byte sequences is too large for in-memory processing, they separate them into multiple sets and feed them to several Naive Bayes models. To solve this issue, Kolter and Maloof (Kolter and Maloof, 2004) propose to use information gain to select the most informative byte sequences as features, which improves both accuracy and scalability. Further research (Moskovitch et al., 2008; Dai et al., 2009; Santos et al., 2013) suggests that opcode sequences are more effective features than byte sequences because the meaning of instruction operands, e.g., memory addresses, constants, varies in different contexts. Therefore, the operands should not be included in any features. Since byte sequences include the operands while opcodes do not, opcodes are thus better features. Due to the fact that malware programs may use obfuscation, packing, polymorphism, and metamorphism to hide their original malicious code, some researchers therefore propose dynamic approaches. It involves running target executables in an isolated environment and monitoring the executed instructions and invoked system calls as features (Fredrikson et al., 2010; Ye et al., 2010; Dahl et al., 2013; Kolosnjaji et al., 2016; Huang and Stokes, 2016). The disadvantage of dynamic approaches is that running executables and logging their behaviors are time-consuming and do not reveal all possible execution paths (Bayer et al., 2006).

All of the aforementioned works apply machine learning models on their proposed features to classify executables. In contrast, we use function clusters as the basis for the classification. Chen et al. (2015) also
propose to classify malware using function clusters. They assume files belonging to the same malware family share some common functions. They group functions of samples from the same malware family in clusters, where any two functions can be connected directly or indirectly using a clone relation. They pick one function from each cluster as an exemplar to be a signature of its malware family. Among all kinds of clone detection methods Ding et al. (2016); Farhadi et al. (2014, 2015); Cordy and Roy (2011); Ding et al. (2019), they use the NiCad clone detector (Cordy and Roy, 2011) to determine whether two functions are a clone of each other. In the testing phase, they detect whether a target file contains any function that is a clone of an exemplary function that represents a signature of a malware family. If a match is found, the file is classified to be an instance of that malware family. Their method is primitive and suffers from the following issues:

1. Using one exemplar function to represent a cluster of functions is problematic. As the same function evolves over different generations of malware samples in the same family, the newest version may be quite different than the older versions (Cabaj et al., 2017). If the oldest version is picked as the exemplar, there is a large chance for the clone detector to fail in identifying some of its new unknown generations.

2. Their function clusters may not be discriminative. Some function clusters may be common in most malware families or even legitimate software. Intuitively, they are not appropriate to serve as signatures. There is no mechanism in their method to filter out those function clusters.

3. The NiCad clone detector (Cordy and Roy, 2011) cannot recognize function clone pairs that are semantically similar, but syntactically very different.

4. Their task is malware classification of Android applications, which are written in Java. Neither in their approach nor with NiCad do they explain how they handle obfuscation, which is quite common in Java malware.

Our model addresses all of these issues.

Another related topic to this paper is locality sensitive hashing (LSH). LSH is proposed to serve as a fast and approximate solution to the nearest neighbor problem (Indyk and Motwani, 1998). It is based on the property that LSH functions lead to the results that data points that are close to each other in their vector space have relatively high probability to have the same hash value. Although LSH is mostly used for real-life nearest neighbor problems (Ding et al., 2016; Bawa et al., 2005; Jain et al., 2008; Kulis and Grauman, 2009; Sæbjørnsen et al., 2009), it can also be used for data clustering. Koga et al. (2007) apply LSH to find the closest cluster to an intermediate data cluster in their agglomerative hierarchical clustering algorithm. In a different way, Ravichandran et al. (2005) use LSH functions to accelerate the speed of flat clustering. Their objective is to cluster similar nouns from a collection of nouns. The vectors of nouns have very large dimension in their case, so they minimize the number of times to compute their cosine similarities by generating signatures with LSH functions to sort items and only compare objects near each other in the sorted lists and with similar signatures. The sub-problem of this paper to cluster similar functions is the same as theirs at an abstract level. However, in our case, the dimension of the vectors representing functions is small and the number of functions could be very large. In our LSH-based clustering algorithm, we do not have to avoid the cosine similarity computation, but we avoid the sorting procedure.

3 OUR APPROACH

Figure 1 illustrates an overview of our approach. The executables are first disassembled and the assembly
code functions are fed into the representation learning module of a clone search engine to generate function vector representations, such that semantically similar functions have a high cosine similarity measure. Next, the function representations are fed into a clustering algorithm to construct function clusters that can be used to discriminate malicious executables of some families from others. In the testing phase, we disassemble a target executable and use the function clone search engine to determine whether each function of it is a clone of any function belonging to a cluster. The results are used to calculate the confidence at which the target executable belongs to each malware family.

3.1 Disassembling

In the first step, we use IDA Pro\(^1\), a commercial disassembler, to disassemble the executable samples in \(E\). The output is a set of assembly code functions of the executables.

3.2 Function Representation Learning

In this step, we learn the vector representations of the disassembled code functions with \textit{Asm2Vec} (Ding et al., 2019), an open source function clone search engine based on representation learning. In the literature of function clone search, when the semantic similarity between two functions is larger than a threshold, which is automatically decided by a clone search engine or defined by a user, they are considered to be a clone of each other. Given a target function, the objective of a clone search engine is to retrieve the top- \(k\) semantically similar functions indexed in the code repository, which have semantic similarities with the target function larger than the threshold. The mechanism of \textit{Asm2Vec} is to train an unsupervised learning model to generate vector representations of functions. The cosine similarity of the vector representations of two functions represents their semantic similarity: \(\cos(\theta(u, v)) = \frac{u \cdot v}{||u|| \cdot ||v||}\) where vector \(u\) and \(v\) are the semantic representations of two functions and \(\theta(u, v)\) is the angle between vector \(u\) and \(v\). We use the representation learning module of \textit{Asm2Vec} to generate the representations of functions disassembled in the previous step. We choose \textit{Asm2Vec} because it has been taken as one of the best solutions for single-platform clone search (Zuo et al., 2018; Massarelli et al., 2019b,a) for the following reasons:

1. It is capable to recognize semantically similar function pairs, even though they may appear syntactically different.

2. It has been shown to be more resilient to code obfuscation and compiler optimization than other clone search engines.

To learn function representations, \textit{Asm2Vec} uses co-occurrence relationships among assembly tokens (i.e., opcodes and operands) and discovers rich lexical semantic relationships among them. It learns vector representations of assembly tokens and of assembly code functions simultaneously in the training phase and computes the representations of target functions in the testing phase. We refer the readers to the original paper for more details (Ding et al., 2019).

3.3 Discriminative Function Clustering

Consider an undirected graph where the vertices are assembly functions and edges exist between functions that are clones of each other, then a function cluster is a connected component of the graph. In other words, functions that are in the same cluster are connected directly or indirectly through clone relations. Some clusters resemble the commonality of malware families, but others do not, because the clusters are too common in all kinds of malware families or also in legitimate software. In other words, they are not discriminative for the classification problem. Therefore, we want to exclude them and keep only the discriminative ones. In contrast, Chen et al. (2015) isolate functions from each malware family and then cluster them for each family separately. Their solution cannot identify or exclude non-discriminative function clusters.

3.3.1 Discriminative Assembly Code Function Cluster

Before describing the algorithms to construct discriminative clusters, we first define the discriminative power of a cluster. Intuitively, the larger the percentage of executables in a malware family contain a function that belongs to a cluster, the more likely the cluster is a commonality of that family. However, if for every malware family there is a large percentage of executables containing a function that belongs to a cluster, the cluster is not discriminative anymore, since it is a commonality of all malware families. Therefore, a large difference on the popularity of a cluster among different malware families indicates a good discriminative power. Figure 2 illustrates this idea. We give a formal definition of a discriminative cluster below.

Consider a set of predefined malware families \(C = \{C_1, \ldots, C_m\}\), a collection of executable samples \(E\), a set of assembly functions \(F = \{f_1, \ldots, f_n\}\), and a

\(^1\text{https://www.hex-rays.com/products/ida/}\)
set of assembly function clusters $G = \{G_1, \ldots, G_l\}$, where each $G_i \subseteq F$. Each executable sample $e \in E$ is a subset of assembly functions $e \subseteq F$. Each executable sample $e \in E$ belongs to a malware family $C_e \in C$. Let $\text{exe}(G_i)$ denotes the set of executables that have function(s) in cluster $G_i$. Formally, $\text{exe}(G_i) = \{e | \exists f, f \in e \land f \in G_i\}$.

Next, we define the notion of overlapping between a malware family and a cluster in terms of common functions. $\text{conf}(G_i, C_j)$ denotes the set of functions in executables of family $C_j$ that are also in cluster $G_i$. Formally, $\text{conf}(G_i, C_j) = \{f | \forall f, f \in e \land e \in C_j \land f \in G_i\}$. $|\text{conf}(G_i, C_j)|$ is the cardinality of $\text{conf}(G_i, C_j)$ and denotes the number of overlapping functions between $G_i$ and $C_j$ in this context. $||\text{conf}(G_i, C_j)||$ denotes the $|\text{conf}(G_i, C_j)|$ normalized by the number of executables in family $C_j$. $||\text{conf}(G_i, C_j)|| = \frac{|\text{conf}(G_i, C_j)|}{|C_j|}$. To put in plain words, $||\text{conf}(G_i, C_j)||$ is the percentage of executables in family $C_j$ that has at least one function in cluster $G_i$. The popularity of a malware family $C_j$ in cluster $G_i$, denoted by $\text{pop}(G_i, C_j)$, is shown in Equation 1.

$$\text{pop}(G_i, C_j) = \frac{||\text{conf}(G_i, C_j)||}{\sum_{j=1}^{m} ||\text{conf}(G_i, C_j)||}$$ (1)

We have $\sum_{j=1}^{m} \text{pop}(G_i, C_j) = 1$. If a cluster contains functions from only one executable, then it probably characterizes only that executable itself rather than the malware family it belongs to. Therefore, the discriminative power only exists in clusters that consist of functions from at least two executables. Intuitively, if the difference between the popularity of different malware families of a cluster is large, then the discriminative power of the cluster is high. We define the **discriminative power** of a cluster $G_i$, denoted by $d_p(G_i)$, based on this intuition.

**Definition 3.1** (Cluster Discriminative Power). We define the discriminative power of cluster $G_i$ as follows. If $|\text{exe}(G_i)| = 1$, then $d_p(G_i) = 0$. Otherwise, $d_p(G_i) = \max\{\text{pop}(G_i, C_j)\} - \min\{\text{pop}(G_i, C_j)\}$. ■

**Discriminative assembly code function clusters** are the clusters that have high discriminative powers. In other words, the clusters that can be used to differentiate malware families.

**Definition 3.2** (Discriminative Assembly Code Function Cluster). A cluster $G_i$ is a discriminative assembly code function cluster if $d_p(G_i) \geq \theta_1$, where $0 \leq \theta_1 \leq 1$ is a prespecified threshold. ■

### 3.3.2 LSH-based Discriminative Clustering Algorithm

To construct discriminative clusters, we do it in two steps. The first step is to construct function clusters. The second step is to calculate the discriminative power of the clusters and keep only those with a high discriminative power.

The most straightforward way to group functions in clusters is also done in two steps. The first step is to compute the semantic similarity between every function pair and find all function clones. The second is to use a Union-Find (a.k.a. Disjoint Set) algorithm to combine the unions of two functions that are clones of each other. For the latter part, we adopt the
We use a family of LSH functions as follows: each hash function corresponds to a random vector \( r \) which has the same dimension as the assembly code function vector representation. The hash value of an assembly code function vector representation \( u \) is computed as follows:
\[
h_r(u) = \begin{cases} 
1 & u \cdot r > 0 \\
0 & u \cdot r \leq 0
\end{cases}
\]

It has been proven (Indyk and Motwani, 1998) that for vector \( u \) and vector \( v \), the probability that they have the same hash value of the same LSH function is as follows:
\[
Pr[h_r(u) = h_r(v)] = 1 - \frac{\theta(u, v)}{\pi}
\]

Two functions that are clones of each other are semantically similar and have a large cosine similarity \( \cos(\theta(u, v)) \), i.e., small value of \( \theta(u, v) \). They thus stand a better chance to have the same hash value. Therefore, we propose the algorithm \( LSH\_Separation \) described as Algorithm 1 to put potentially semantically similar assembly functions in the same bucket. First, we gradually apply LSH functions on the assembly functions and form a signature composed of hash values produced by the hash functions for each assembly code function. Then, we place the assembly functions having the same signature in the same bucket. If the number of functions of a bucket is less than a certain number \( n_{f,b} \), the bucket is saved and excluded from the subsequent procedure. If a certain number \( n_{h,\text{max}} \) of hash functions have been applied, even though there could still be some buckets holding more than \( n_{f,b} \) functions, the procedure stops and all the remaining buckets are saved. Each saved bucket contains potentially semantically similar assembly functions, so we compute the semantic similarity between every function pair in a bucket and feed all function clone pairs to the Union-Find algorithm to group them in clusters.

It is still possible that semantically similar assembly functions are separated in different buckets. To solve this issue, we repeat the algorithm \( LSH\_Separation \) \( l \) times and compute the similarities between functions in every bucket produced by the algorithm in the \( l \) times. Practically, \( l \) does not have to be large and \( l = 2 \) is usually enough. Let us use an example to illustrate this idea. Consider a function cluster of \( m \) functions. It is separated in two buckets by an LSH function when we apply \( LSH\_Separation \) for the first time. Then, we compare the semantic similarity between every function pair in each bucket to find function clone pairs. If we apply the Union-Find algorithm on the function clone pairs that we find from the two buckets, we form two separate clusters with the functions from the original function cluster. Then, when we apply \( LSH\_Separation \) for the second time,
the original cluster is probably not separated the same way as in the first time. Any two functions that are a clone of each other in the cluster and separated in different buckets the first time, but in the same bucket the second time, are recognized as a function clone pair. The two clusters they belong to are combined and we get the original cluster.

The time complexity of applying LSH\_Separation algorithm \(l\) times is \(O(l \times (n_{h_{\text{max}} \times n})) = O(ln_{h_{\text{max}}}n)\). The time complexity to compute the semantic similarity between every function pair in all generated buckets is \(O(l \times (n_{f_b} \times n_{f_b})) = O(ln_{f_b}n)\). The total time complexity is \(O(ln_{h_{\text{max}}}n + ln_{f_b}n) = O(ln_{h_{\text{max}}} + n_{f_b})n\). Since \(l\), \(n_{h_{\text{max}}}\), and \(n_{f_b}\) are constants and much smaller than \(n\), we reduce the time complexity of finding all function clone pairs from \(O(n^2)\) to a practically linear procedure.

After we use our optimized algorithm to find function clone pairs and the Union-Find algorithm to construct the clusters, we just need to compute their discriminative powers according to our definition and remove the non-discriminative ones.

### 3.3.3 Cluster Labeling

Chen et al. (2015) assign a hard malware family label to a cluster, since their clusters are formed within individual families. We also assign a label to be the family which takes the largest popularity in cluster \(G_i\): \(\text{label}(G_i) = \arg\max_{C_j} \{\text{pop}(G_i,C_j)\}\). However, a function cluster may be common in multiple malware families. Therefore, we still keep all \(\text{pop}(G_i,C_j)\) of a cluster \(G_i\) for classifying target executables.

### 3.4 Function Clone Search

For a target executable, we use Asm2Vec to detect clone relations between all its functions and the functions in the clusters. Since each cluster is considered to be a set of semantically equivalent functions, if a function of the target executable is a clone of any function in a cluster, it is also considered to be a member of that cluster. As most functions of the executables in the training set do not belong to a discriminative cluster, they are abandoned. By keeping only discriminative clusters, we also greatly reduce the time consumption of this step.

### 3.5 Malicious Executable Classification

To classify a target executable, we calculate an affiliation score for each malware family. If the target executable contains a function that is a member of cluster \(G_i\), then \(\text{pop}(G_i,C_j)\) for all \(j = 1, \ldots, m\) of that cluster \(G_i\) is added to the scores of those malware families. The absolute score accumulated in this way cannot tell the confidence at which a target executable belongs to a malware family. Therefore, for each family, we calculate the scores in the same way for all executables of that family in the training set and find the median. Then, we divide the accumulated score of a target executable by that median to be the confidence at which the executable belongs to that family. If the confidence is larger than 100%, it will be set to 100%.

### 3.6 Visualization

Our approach supports visualizing the composition of the formed clusters and the interpretation of the classification results. For each cluster, the family popularity and its function composition can be viewed to examine whether they are good signatures of the corresponding families. An example is given in Figure 3. If some clusters are found to be not reasonably good signatures or some functions should not be included in a cluster, they can be manually deleted. This ability to allow human-in-the-loop is a unique advantage of our classification model. To provide a justification for the classification of a target executable, its functions that belong to a cluster and the functions in the clusters that are clones of them can also be viewed.
Table 1: Statistics of the dataset.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Class</th>
<th>Training</th>
<th>Validation</th>
<th>Test</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td># of exec</td>
<td># of func</td>
<td># of exec</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Autoit</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>141,763</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bundlore</td>
<td>186</td>
<td>72,674</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emotet</td>
<td>175</td>
<td>8,714</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fireseria</td>
<td>131</td>
<td>68,605</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gamarue</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>141,312</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hotbar</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>124,977</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Imali</td>
<td>121</td>
<td>79,108</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Loadmoney</td>
<td>151</td>
<td>39,296</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Softpulse</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>58,289</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Speedingupmypec</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>38,692</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1,179</td>
<td>773,430</td>
<td>388</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

An example is given in Figure 4. This interpretability can help malware analysts better understand the function grouping phenomena among some malware families.

4 EXPERIMENTS

The objectives of our experiments are to (1) evaluate the performance of our dedicated machine learning model for malware classification, compared with other state-of-the-art machine learning solutions, (2) demonstrate that using the proposed concept discriminative power to select function clusters is effective and necessary, and (3) illustrate the interpretability of our classification model.

4.1 Dataset

We evaluate the classification model with a dataset of 10 malware families. It is separated into three parts: training set, validation set, and test set. The validation set is used to tune hyper-parameters, which is the discriminative power threshold in our case. We did not tune the hyper-parameters of Asm2Vec, including the dimension of vectors representing the functions and the threshold to determine clone relation, as we use the default values. There is no overlapping of executables between the training, validation, and test sets. To evaluate the generalizability of all classification methods, the dataset is organized in a time split setting (Saxe and Berlin, 2015), i.e., the samples in the test set are chosen as the ones that are compiled later than the samples in the training and validation set. In Table 1, we present the statistics. The dataset is not very large in terms of number of executables in each malware family and the class distribution is uneven by nature. These conditions make it challenging for machine learning-based classification models.

We collect the malware samples from MalShare and VirusShare. We use the AVClass malware labeling tool (Sebastián et al., 2016) to generate the malware family label of the malware samples, based on analysis reports from VirusTotal. It should be noted that some malware samples use packing, polymorphism, or metamorphism. For them, IDA Pro can identify zero or only one function. We do not include those samples in our dataset, since our focus is not on accounting for those techniques but on classifying malware samples based on the functions that are already revealed. Asm2Vec can identify the clone relation between an obfuscated function and its original function, so obfuscation is not a concern.

Our experiment focuses on evaluating the accuracy of the classification results. We also evaluate the precision, recall, and F1 for each family. The classification of an executable is correct if the predicted family, i.e., the class with the highest confidence, matches its real family label.

4.2 Comparing with State-of-the-Art Models

We compare our approach with the following state-of-the-art static malware classification methods.

- **Mosk2008OpBi**: Moskovitch et al. (2008) propose to use TF or TF-IDF of opcode bi-grams as features and use document frequency (DF), information gain ratio, or Fisher score as the criteria for feature selection. They apply Artificial Neural Networks, Decision Trees, Naïve Bayes, Boosted Decision Trees, and Boosted Naïve Bayes as their malware classification models.

2https://www.virustotal.com/
### Table 2: Experiment results on each malware family.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Malware family</th>
<th>Our method</th>
<th>Bald2013Meta</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Precision</td>
<td>Recall</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Autoit</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>1.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bundlore</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>0.97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emotet</td>
<td>0.98</td>
<td>0.96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Firseria</td>
<td>0.98</td>
<td>1.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gamarue</td>
<td>0.97</td>
<td>0.94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hotbar</td>
<td>0.96</td>
<td>1.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Imali</td>
<td>0.98</td>
<td>1.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Loadmoney</td>
<td>0.96</td>
<td>0.98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Softpulse</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>1.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Speedingupmypc</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>1.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weighted Average</td>
<td>0.98</td>
<td>0.99</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- **Bald2013Meta:** Baldangombo et al. (2013) propose to extract multiple raw features from PE headers and use information Gain and calling frequencies for feature selection and PCA for dimension reduction. They apply SVM, J48, and Naïve Bayes as their malware classification models.

- **Saxe2015Deep:** Saxe and Berlin (2015) propose a deep learning model that works on four different features: byte/entropy histogram features, PE import features, string 2D histogram features, and PE metadata numerical features.

- **Mour2019CNN:** Mourtaji et al. (2019) convert malware binaries to grayscale images and apply a convolutional neural network (CNN) on malware images for malware classification. Their CNN network has two convolutional layers followed by a fully-connected layer.

### Table 3: Accuracy of different models on the test set.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Method</th>
<th>Accuracy</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Our Method</td>
<td>98.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Our Method (all clusters)</td>
<td>94.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mosk2008OpBi</td>
<td>82.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bald2013Meta</td>
<td>97.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saxe2015Deep</td>
<td>96.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mour2019CNN</td>
<td>55.1%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### 4.3 Classification Results

We show the classification accuracy of our approach and the state-of-the-art models for comparison in Table 3. The first row is the results of the exact model we proposed and the second row shows the results of our model without excluding clusters of low discriminative power. From the table, we can see that by keeping only the discriminative clusters, our approach achieves significantly better results. This verifies the effectiveness of our proposed concept of discriminative power and the importance of using it to exclude the interference of irrelevance functions in non-discriminative clusters. The previous methods for comparison achieve different performances and the accuracy is lower than what they report in their papers. This may be due to the fact that the dataset is relatively small and ordinary machine learning models require a large dataset to train, while our model works at the assembly function level to mitigate this issue. This result shows the advantage of our proposed model since in real-life scenarios, some malware families do not contain a lot of samples.

In Table 2, we compare our method with Bald2013Meta, which is the best model for comparison, regarding precision, recall and F1 for each malware family. We can see that Bald2013Meta achieves lower F1 on malware families with less training samples such as Autoit and Hotbar, while our model have no such issue. This confirms our statement that general machine learning models are less robust with datasets of uneven class distribution, while our model uses the concept of *Discriminative assembly code function clusters*, which takes uneven class distribution into consideration, and thus does not suffer from this issue.

### 4.4 Visualizing Clusters

The clusters of each family and the functions that form them can be visualized. An example is shown in Figure 3. We can see the list of clusters for each malware family, the functions in each cluster, and the class popularity $\text{pop}(G_{i}, C_{j})$ of each cluster.

To provide an in-depth understanding of the clusters, we carefully examined the formed clusters of the two datasets. According to our observation, we find $\min_{j}\{\text{pop}(G_{i}, C_{j})\} = 0$ for all saved clusters. This means that for every saved cluster, there is always at least one malware family that has no function in it.
The two reasons leading to this result are as follows: (1) some of the 10 malware families are quite different from each other. The chance that all of them share some semantically similar functions is very low. (2) A few clusters with \( \min_j \{ \text{pop}(G_i, C_j) \} > 0 \) are automatically filtered, because their discriminative power is low. Therefore, for each cluster \( G_i \) that is saved, we have \( d_p(G_i) = \max_j \{ \text{pop}(G_i, C_j) \} - \min_j \{ \text{pop}(G_i, C_j) \} = \max_j \{ \text{pop}(G_i, C_j) \} \).

We also provide the statistics on the number of classes (\( n_c \)) that have functions in a cluster and the discriminative power (\( d_p(G_i) \) or equivalently \( \max_j \{ \text{pop}(G_i, C_j) \} \)) of a cluster. They are shown in Table 4. Most clusters (i.e., 4,723) are homogeneous: all of their functions are from the same family, i.e., the number of \( n_c = 1 \) or \( \max_j \{ \text{pop}(G_i, C_j) \} > 0.99 \). If there is only one family taking up a large popularity (e.g., \( \max_j \{ \text{pop}(G_i, C_j) \} > 0.90 \)) of cluster \( G_i \), the cluster is obviously a good signature of the family. 988 clusters contain functions from two malware families. We manually examined those clusters concerning two malware families and found that many of them are shared by related malware families that have similar behaviors. Therefore, those clusters characterize both malware families and provide insights on the commonalities of the malware families to reverse engineers.

4.5 Interpretable Classification Results

To interpret the classification results, the executable’s functions that are clones of functions in a cluster and the corresponding cluster are presented. Figure 4 shows an example. The target executable belongs to malware family Autoit. The figure presents a list of functions of it that are clones of functions in a cluster. Its function sub_40B6D0 belongs to cluster Autoit_Cluster186, which we have introduced in Figure 3, since it is a clone of the listed functions in the training set that belong to Autoit_Cluster186. Figure 4 shows that Autoit_Cluster186 consists of 112 functions. However, Figure 4 shows that only 13 of them are found to be clones of sub_40B6D0 in the target executable. Chen et al. (2015) use one exemplary function to represent a cluster in their malware classification system. Their method would fail to identify that sub_40B6D0 belongs to cluster Autoit_Cluster186, if one of the 99 functions in Autoit_Cluster186 that were not determined as clones of sub_40B6D0 in the target executable, was chosen as the exemplar. Our model does not have this concern, as we keep all the functions of a cluster.

5 CONCLUSION

This work is the result of a fruitful collaboration with some reverse engineers in a government agency. The accuracy of a malware classification system is important for system security monitoring usage. Yet, interpretability is also crucial if further investigation or justification is needed on the classification results. In this paper, we propose a novel and dedicated machine learning model for malware classification that has several advantages over the ordinary machine learn-
ing classification models for this task. First, it does not require a large number of samples in each malware family to train the model. Second, using the concept of discriminative power to select discriminative function clusters, our approach can handle datasets with uneven class distribution. Third, unlike ordinary machine learning models, our approach provides interpretable evidence to justify its classification results. It is a practical solution for malware classification.

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